Why haven't asymmetrical keys replaced passwords yet?
imagined security scheme:
1.Generate public/private key pair
2. share public key when creating account with whomever.
3. when logging in, account will send you random string
4. your browser will encrypt string with private key
5. account will decrypt string with your public key, if it is the same string they sent, you are authenticated.
- The biggest problem I see with this is not wanting to use unsecure computers because you would have to share your private key with that computer to log on, but the same could be said for passwords.
- convincing people to carry around a usb stick containing keys seems much easier than convincing them to choose and track dozens of hard to guess/bruteforcable passwords.
@zacharius I think that this in basically what WebAuthn is doing (with the addition of username-like features and per-website key pairs). https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2018/05/webauthn
@zacharius The two issues I see with this is that 1) people are totally going to lose their USBs -- so then they're screwed. 2) USB sticks are a super easy to inject malicious code into a new computer. I've heard of companies with software that auto-formats USB devices upon being plugged into the computer.
How are you seeing this model as more secure than a password manager?
@sgparent I agree that portable drives are a problem and the best practice would be to only store keys on personal devices. This would be a limitation in that you wouldn't be able to log on through any device, but most people carry computers around with them everywhere so I don't think that is too much of an issue.
Keys beat passwords because I don't have to trust a 3rd party with my private key, like I do my passwords. Smart companies store hashes instead of keys anyway but I don't want to have to trust that companies have sane security practices.
Also it is much more manageable to keep track of a keypair than dozen of passwords. I am relatively educated on security and I still reuse most of my passwords. It's not functional to maintain sane security across dozens of account with passwords
@zacharius You also still have the problem of key exfiltration, or impersonating the remote site. As well as trust and reputation.
@zacharius this is literally how it needs to be done
@zacharius Minilock! Minilock! Minilock!
(I hope Minilock is actually as secure as it claims; I have no way of telling. I just love the idea of a super-short public key being my identity, and its matching super-short private key being automatically generated from my username and passphrase).
@zacharius client side ssl certificates are (handwaving) basically this. Here's an article from *10 years ago* lamenting that they never caught on. https://blog.pilif.me/2008/05/26/why-is-nobody-using-ssl-client-certificates/
@zacharius Keep in mind that with PKI you can have entirely unauthenticated /transactions/, by instead authenticating / encrypting /content/.
Post to site, and GPG-sign post. Send private message, encrypted to recipient.
Problem here is that there's massive metadata leakage. CCC have covered this in recent years IIRC.
There's also the directory / routing problem.
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